"When Tom Grimes lost his job as a financial consultant 15 months ago, he called his congressman, a Democrat, for help getting government health care. Then he found a new full-time occupation: Tea Party activist...
Mr. Grimes, who receives Social Security, has filled the back seat of his Mercury Grand Marquis with the literature of the movement, including Glenn Beck’s 'Arguing With Idiots' and Frederic Bastiat’s 'The Law,' which denounces public benefits as 'false philanthropy.' 'If you quit giving people that stuff, they would figure out how to do it on their own,' Mr. Grimes said...
He blames the government for his unemployment. 'Government is absolutely responsible, not because of what they did recently with the car companies, but what they’ve done since the 1980s,' he said. 'The government has allowed free trade and never set up any rules.' He and others do not see any contradictions in their arguments for smaller government even as they argue that it should do more to prevent job loss or cuts to Medicare. After a year of angry debate, emotion outweighs fact."
Sunday, March 28, 2010
And by smaller government we mean...
Monday, January 25, 2010
Keynes vs Hayek: the rap showdown
Keynes and Hayek were certainly ideological opponents during their lives. Hayek was a central figure in the Austrian school of economics, whose focus on voluntary contracts between individuals and the organizing power of the price system saw little role for the government in the economy (or anywhere else). Keynes, on the other hand, argued that markets (capital markets in particular) can fail on their own; when they do, government has a crucial role to play in stabilizing the economy.
Roberts, himself an adherent of the Austrian school, is better positioned to argue Hayek's side (he blogs at "Cafe Hayek"). While Keynes' basic ideas are laid out in the video, much of the nuance is missing (as is probably to be expected in a 6 minute rap-debate on the subject). In particular, I felt Keynes' views on savings were somewhat misrepresented.
In the video, the Keynes character explains his "paradox of thrift" idea: people save money, which is good for them, but it reduces the amount that they spend, which in turns lowers other people's incomes, causing them to save more; this reduces the income of others, perpetuating the cycle. Thus an individually beneficial action (saving) has negative consequences if everyone does it.
Some take the paradox of thrift to mean that "Keynes opposed savings", but this interpretation is simply untrue. James Hamilton explains the distinction:
"...aren't I delighted that consumers are now, finally, saving more? Well, no. It is one thing to identify a higher national saving rate as the long-term goal, and quite another thing to try to get there overnight in the form of a sudden drop in consumption spending. Here I am very much taking the side of Brad DeLong ([1],[2]) and Arnold Kling and against Eugene Fama ([1], [2]) and John Cochrane. The relevant question is whether, in response to an abrupt decrease in consumption spending such as we're now experiencing, some of the other variables (most importantly, Y) might adjust in response as well. It is certainly true that in a very simple economic setting-- for example, an economy that consists of a single farm producing only one good-- the decision to save more of your income (leave some of your wheat unconsumed) is necessarily identical to the decision to invest more (save the wheat for later). And one can write down more complicated models in which economic actors and markets adjust in a way to see through the veil of production and exchange and make sure it is I + X that adjusts in response to a higher saving rate, and not Y."Much of Keynes' theory had to do with the translation of savings into investment. The classical economic perspective was that savings, by definition, equals investment. Thus, if people save more, then they invest more, leaving GDP unchanged. But Keynes argued that when people were fearful about the future, they would hoard money (e.g. stuff money in the mattress), diverting savings from investment. This means that sudden shifts in savings (for example, in response to a financial crisis that hurts household portfolios) can result in an economic contraction. In Keynes' mind, this was where government should enter with stimulus, to counter the drop in spending and soften the blow to the economy.
Is the paradox of thrift real? Not everyone would agree, but Paul Krugman provides some compelling evidence for it.
The point here is that one of the main differences between Keynes and Hayek (indeed between Keynes and most of the economists who came before him) had to do with the nature of the savings/investment relationship. Keynes was not advocating profligate spending for the sake of spending. Rather, he postulated that markets could fail and that government could play a role in mitigating the business cycle.
That being said, I thought the video was great; it was entertaining and provides a wonderful introduction to a major debate in the history of economic thought.
Sunday, January 24, 2010
Social Norms and Strategic Defaults
The morality argument is especially weak in a state like California or Arizona, where mortgages are so-called nonrecourse loans. That means the mortgage is secured by the home itself; in a default, the lender has no claim on a borrower’s other possessions. Nonrecourse mortgages may be viewed as financial transactions in which the borrower has the explicit option of giving the lender the keys to the house and walking away. Under these circumstances, deciding whether to default might be no more controversial than deciding whether to claim insurance after your house burns down.Of course, if people were more likely to default, then the implicit costs would be higher than the $800 estimated by Susan Woodward. Still, many homeowners are continuing to make mortgage payments at a loss, and it would be interesting to see how they behaved if they felt they already paid fees to cover the risk of default.
In fact, borrowers in nonrecourse states pay extra for the right to default without recourse. In a report prepared for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Susan Woodward, an economist, estimated that home buyers in such states paid an extra $800 in closing costs for each $100,000 they borrowed. These fees are not made explicit to the borrower, but if they were, more people might be willing to default, figuring that they had paid for the right to do so.
Friday, January 8, 2010
Should we hold homeowners to a higher moral standard than businesses?
"John Courson, president and C.E.O. of the Mortgage Bankers Association, recently told The Wall Street Journal that homeowners who default on their mortgages should think about the 'message' they will send to 'their family and their kids and their friends.' Courson was implying that homeowners — record numbers of whom continue to default — have a responsibility to make good."
"The moral suasion has continued under President Obama, who has urged that homeowners follow the 'responsible' course. Indeed, HUD-approved housing counselors are supposed to counsel people against foreclosure."
Sunday, December 6, 2009
How I learned to stop worrying and love the deficit
"...when total spending falls well below the level required for full employment, the economy won’t recover quickly on its own. Consumers won’t lead the way, because even those who still have jobs are fearful they might lose them. And most businesses won’t invest, since they already have more capacity than they need. Only government, Mr. Keynes concluded, has both the motive and opportunity to increase spending significantly during deep downturns.
Of course, if the government borrows to do so, the debt must eventually be repaid (or the interest on it must be paid forever). That fact has provoked strident protests about government “bankrupting our grandchildren.” It’s an absurd complaint. Failure to stimulate the economy would mean a longer downturn. That, in turn, would mean longer stretches of reduced tax receipts, increased unemployment insurance payouts, and depressed private investment. The net result? Higher total public borrowing and a permanent decline in productivity compared with what we would have had under effective economic stimulus. Once the economy is back on its feet, deficit logic changes. At full employment, extra borrowing often compromises future prosperity, just as critics say. On President George W. Bush’s watch, for example, the national debt rose from $5 trillion to $10 trillion. Some of that borrowing paid for an expansion of prescription coverage and a financial bailout a year ago, but most went for a war in Iraq and tax cuts that largely just allowed for additional consumption. Our grandchildren will be forever poorer as a result.
But the reverse would be true if government borrowing were used for productive investments. After decades of neglect of the nation’s infrastructure, attractive public investment opportunities abound. It’s been estimated, for example, that eliminating bottlenecks on the Northeast rail corridor would generate $12 billion in benefits at a cost of only $6 billion. These are present value estimates. When government undertakes such investments, our grandchildren become richer, not poorer...
In the meantime, however, such commentary continues to render intelligent political decisions about deficits less likely. For example, 58 percent of respondents in a recent NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll said the president and Congress should worry less about bolstering the economy than keeping the deficit down, while only 35 percent said economic recovery was a higher priority. If we really want to bankrupt our grandchildren, that poll charts a promising course."
Friday, October 2, 2009
Debating the Keynesian Multiplier
"The bottom line is this: The available empirical evidence does not support the idea that spending multipliers typically exceed one, and thus spending stimulus programs will likely raise GDP by less than the increase in government spending. Defense-spending multipliers exceeding one likely apply only at very high unemployment rates, and nondefense multipliers are probably smaller. However, there is empirical support for the proposition that tax rate reductions will increase real GDP."
- In developing countries, the response of output to increases in government spending is smaller on impact and considerably less persistent than in high income countries.
- The degree of exchange rate flexibility is a critical determinant of the size of fiscal multipliers. Economies operating under predetermined exchange rate regimes have long-run multipliers of around 1.5, but economies with flexible exchange rate regimes have essentially zero multipliers.
- The degree of openness to trade (measured as exports plus imports as a proportion of GDP) is another critical determinant. Relatively closed economies have long-run multipliers of around 1.6, but relatively open economies have very small or zero multipliers.
- In highly-indebted countries, the output response to increases in government spending is short-lived and much less persistent than in countries with a low debt to GDP ratio.
- The multipliers for the US in the post-1980 period are rather small (in the range 0.3-0.4) both in the short and long-run. On the other hand, multipliers for government investment are large (around 2).
Fiscal stimulus in rich vs. poor countries:"Thus whilst the multiplier is larger in a poor community, the effect on employment will be much greater in a wealthy community, assuming that in the latter current investment represents a larger proportion of current output." (p126)Trade openess and fiscal stimulus:"In an open system with foreign trade relations, some part of the multiplier of the increased investment will accrue to the benefit of employment in foreign countries... so that if we consider only the effect on domestic employment as distinct from world employment, we must diminish the full figure of the multiplier." (p120)
"On a happier note, this piece by Ilzetzki et al is interesting, and offers a wide range of multipliers depending on a country's situation. The question for the United States is which estimate is most relevant.
I'd say it's the fixed exchange rate estimate. Yes, I know, we have a floating rate. But they explain the relatively high fixed-rate number by pointing to Mundell-Fleming, which says that fiscal policy is effective under fixed rates because it doesn't drive up interest rates (capital flows in). We're in a similar position for a different reason: fiscal expansion doesn't drive up rates because we're at the zero bound.
Oh, we're also relatively closed.
The thing is that both the fixed rate and closed multipliers are around 1.5 — which so happens to be just about the number assumed by Christina Romer in her analysis for the Obama administration. Just saying."
Sunday, April 19, 2009
Double standards on taxes
...many protesters implicitly assume that that the deficit has increased solely as a result of Barack Obama's policies. But in fact, the Congressional Budget Office was projecting a deficit of more than $1 trillion this year back in January, before any of Obama's policies had been enacted, and a cumulative deficit of $4.3 trillion through 2019. (CBO made no assumptions about what his policies might be in making its projection.)I'm not saying that because a Republican ran up debt, it's OK for Democrats to do it as well. But I think there are some serious misconceptions about how much the Obama administration's policies change the debt situation. First, much of the current increase in the deficit is the result of decreased tax revenues, which are the result of a bad economy. Second, the Bush administration bequeathed a number of policies that would increase the debt far enough after he left office.
It's true that projected deficits have gotten larger since January. But much of this resulted from deteriorating economic conditions that would have occurred even if John McCain were president. Moreover, it is absurd to assume that McCain would not have enacted any stimulus programs had he been elected.
More than likely, McCain would have proposed a stimulus plan of roughly the same size as that proposed by Obama. No doubt, it would have had a different composition--heavier on tax cuts, different kinds of tax cuts, less spending, different spending--but it wouldn't have been all that different from Obama's package given large Democratic majorities in the House and Senate and the pressure to act quickly.
I strongly suspect that many of those that loudly denounced the Obama stimulus package for its impact on the deficit would have cheered the McCain stimulus package even though it would have increased the deficit by about the same amount.
Proof of this proposition is that there were no tea parties during the years when George W. Bush was turning the surpluses of the Clinton years into massive deficits. Indeed, if concerns about deficits are the primary motivation for this week's tax protests, then these same people should have been holding demonstrations of support for Bill Clinton in 2000 when the federal government ran a budget surplus of 2.4% of the gross domestic product--equivalent to a surplus of $336 billion this year.
The truth is that the greatest addition to national indebtedness occurred in 2003 when Bush rammed through the Republican Congress a massive expansion of Medicare to provide drug benefits even though the system was already broke. According to the latest report from Medicare's trustees, the drug benefit added $7.9 trillion to the nation's indebtedness. This should have led to massive tax protests on April 15, 2004. But, of course, there weren't any. Those protesting this week were only protesting because it is a Democrat who has increased the deficit. When a Republican did worse, it's like Emily Litella used to say, "Never mind."
People should remember that while they have the right to their opinion, they are not entitled to be taken seriously. That only comes from having credibility gained by the correct presentation of facts and analysis and a willingness to be even-handed--criticizing one's own side when it is wrong and not only speaking up when the other party does the same thing.
Friday, February 6, 2009
The long road down
That last part is important. Right now, we're still doing better than in the early 1980s (and much better than the 1930s), but the real question is: where are we going? Many economists think we've got a long way to go.The government said that 385,000 more jobs were lost last year than it had initially estimated. That brings the total loss since December 2007 to 3.6 million jobs. To put that in some perspective, here are the worst employment losses, as a share of the work force, over the last 40 years:
Keep in mind that the numbers for those earlier recessions describe the absolute low point of the job market. The losses in this recession aren’t yet over — and may, in fact, be a long way from over.1981-82: 3.1 percent
1974-75: 2.8 percent
Current (2007-09): 2.6 percent
Things certainly have changed over the past 16 years:
(HT: Paul Krugman)