Showing posts with label recession. Show all posts
Showing posts with label recession. Show all posts

Sunday, March 28, 2010

And by smaller government we mean...

I'm trying really hard not to dismiss the Tea Party out of hand. I think it's reductionist and unfair to regard its members as simply motivated by racism (though perhaps some are) or suggest that the whole movement is part of some fell funded Republican campaign (though some of it is). That being said, I'm having a tough time buying the argument that the Tea Party really wants smaller government. Take this recent New York Times profile of recently unemployed supporters of the movement:
"When Tom Grimes lost his job as a financial consultant 15 months ago, he called his congressman, a Democrat, for help getting government health care. Then he found a new full-time occupation: Tea Party activist...

Mr. Grimes, who receives Social Security, has filled the back seat of his Mercury Grand Marquis with the literature of the movement, including Glenn Beck’s 'Arguing With Idiots' and Frederic Bastiat’s 'The Law,' which denounces public benefits as 'false philanthropy.' 'If you quit giving people that stuff, they would figure out how to do it on their own,' Mr. Grimes said...

He blames the government for his unemployment. 'Government is absolutely responsible, not because of what they did recently with the car companies, but what they’ve done since the 1980s,' he said. 'The government has allowed free trade and never set up any rules.' He and others do not see any contradictions in their arguments for smaller government even as they argue that it should do more to prevent job loss or cuts to Medicare. After a year of angry debate, emotion outweighs fact."
Obviously smaller government would have less trade restrictions and fewer retraining programs for workers. In fact, one of history's most vocal supporters of free trade is Bastiat, who is required reading for libertarians. These are not small contradictions.

Of course these are just one person's views. But polls of Tea Party supporters seem to suggest similar inconsistencies. For example, a recent Bloomberg poll found that while 90% of Tea Party supporters fret that the US is moving toward "socialism", 70% favor the federal government fostering job creation. Further, half of those polled favored government restrictions on Wall Street salaries and their views were mixed about privatizing Medicare and other federal programs.

In fact the real gripe may not be the size of government, per se, but the perceived bias in policy. A CBS News/New York Times poll found that Tea Party supporters were more likely than other Americans to feel that "President Obama is working mainly on behalf of the poor, and not the middle class."

These polls pose interesting questions about the future of the Tea Party and what its impact on policy will ultimately be. Will the movement maintain its relevance when unemployment falls below 7%? Will deficit concerns impact legislation that largely benefits the middle class? (Note, that the 2003 passage of Medicare Part D, the hugely expensive but unfunded expansion of Medicare, met with no opposition from anti-deficit campaigners.)

Personally, I think the Tea Party will fizzle as the economy improves. While Americans in general are less amenable to large government than Europeans, the views expressed by Tea Party supporters don't indicate any large ideological shift. People are angry because times are tough and they feel neglected. But that doesn't mean we're headed toward some small-government Randian utopia.

Monday, January 25, 2010

Keynes vs Hayek: the rap showdown

Russ Roberts' long awaited (by me at least) new music video is here. Roberts, an economist by trade, wrote the lyrics for a rap battle between John Maynard Keynes and F. A. Hayek on the nature of the business cycle:



Keynes and Hayek were certainly ideological opponents during their lives. Hayek was a central figure in the Austrian school of economics, whose focus on voluntary contracts between individuals and the organizing power of the price system saw little role for the government in the economy (or anywhere else). Keynes, on the other hand, argued that markets (capital markets in particular) can fail on their own; when they do, government has a crucial role to play in stabilizing the economy.

Roberts, himself an adherent of the Austrian school, is better positioned to argue Hayek's side (he blogs at "Cafe Hayek"). While Keynes' basic ideas are laid out in the video, much of the nuance is missing (as is probably to be expected in a 6 minute rap-debate on the subject). In particular, I felt Keynes' views on savings were somewhat misrepresented.

In the video, the Keynes character explains his "paradox of thrift" idea: people save money, which is good for them, but it reduces the amount that they spend, which in turns lowers other people's incomes, causing them to save more; this reduces the income of others, perpetuating the cycle. Thus an individually beneficial action (saving) has negative consequences if everyone does it.

Some take the paradox of thrift to mean that "Keynes opposed savings", but this interpretation is simply untrue. James Hamilton explains the distinction:
"...aren't I delighted that consumers are now, finally, saving more? Well, no. It is one thing to identify a higher national saving rate as the long-term goal, and quite another thing to try to get there overnight in the form of a sudden drop in consumption spending. Here I am very much taking the side of Brad DeLong ([1],[2]) and Arnold Kling and against Eugene Fama ([1], [2]) and John Cochrane. The relevant question is whether, in response to an abrupt decrease in consumption spending such as we're now experiencing, some of the other variables (most importantly, Y) might adjust in response as well. It is certainly true that in a very simple economic setting-- for example, an economy that consists of a single farm producing only one good-- the decision to save more of your income (leave some of your wheat unconsumed) is necessarily identical to the decision to invest more (save the wheat for later). And one can write down more complicated models in which economic actors and markets adjust in a way to see through the veil of production and exchange and make sure it is I + X that adjusts in response to a higher saving rate, and not Y."
Much of Keynes' theory had to do with the translation of savings into investment. The classical economic perspective was that savings, by definition, equals investment. Thus, if people save more, then they invest more, leaving GDP unchanged. But Keynes argued that when people were fearful about the future, they would hoard money (e.g. stuff money in the mattress), diverting savings from investment. This means that sudden shifts in savings (for example, in response to a financial crisis that hurts household portfolios) can result in an economic contraction. In Keynes' mind, this was where government should enter with stimulus, to counter the drop in spending and soften the blow to the economy.

Is the paradox of thrift real? Not everyone would agree, but Paul Krugman provides some compelling evidence for it.

The point here is that one of the main differences between Keynes and Hayek (indeed between Keynes and most of the economists who came before him) had to do with the nature of the savings/investment relationship. Keynes was not advocating profligate spending for the sake of spending. Rather, he postulated that markets could fail and that government could play a role in mitigating the business cycle.

That being said, I thought the video was great; it was entertaining and provides a wonderful introduction to a major debate in the history of economic thought.

Sunday, January 24, 2010

Social Norms and Strategic Defaults

Richard Thaler has some interesting analysis of why more underwater homeowners don't simply default on their mortgages. As I've written before, social norms play a large role. This was particularly interesting:
The morality argument is especially weak in a state like California or Arizona, where mortgages are so-called nonrecourse loans. That means the mortgage is secured by the home itself; in a default, the lender has no claim on a borrower’s other possessions. Nonrecourse mortgages may be viewed as financial transactions in which the borrower has the explicit option of giving the lender the keys to the house and walking away. Under these circumstances, deciding whether to default might be no more controversial than deciding whether to claim insurance after your house burns down.

In fact, borrowers in nonrecourse states pay extra for the right to default without recourse. In a report prepared for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Susan Woodward, an economist, estimated that home buyers in such states paid an extra $800 in closing costs for each $100,000 they borrowed. These fees are not made explicit to the borrower, but if they were, more people might be willing to default, figuring that they had paid for the right to do so.
Of course, if people were more likely to default, then the implicit costs would be higher than the $800 estimated by Susan Woodward. Still, many homeowners are continuing to make mortgage payments at a loss, and it would be interesting to see how they behaved if they felt they already paid fees to cover the risk of default.

Friday, January 8, 2010

Should we hold homeowners to a higher moral standard than businesses?

In the wake of the collapse of the housing bubble, nearly 11 million American families are "underwater", meaning that they owe more money on their mortgage than their house is currently worth. Some of these families simply can't afford to make the mortgage payments. Others can make the payments, but have decided to walk away from what is clearly a losing financial proposition. By pursuing "strategic default", these families allow banks or other lenders to foreclose on their homes and eat the loss. This allows them to seek other housing options and re-build their financial lives. While this is often a good individual financial move, not everyone agrees that it is the (morally) correct thing to do. Roger Lowenstein's interesting piece in the New York Times Magazine highlights this point:
"John Courson, president and C.E.O. of the Mortgage Bankers Association, recently told The Wall Street Journal that homeowners who default on their mortgages should think about the 'message' they will send to 'their family and their kids and their friends.' Courson was implying that homeowners — record numbers of whom continue to default — have a responsibility to make good."
Mortgage bankers aren't the only ones who feel this way. The US government similarly discourages strategic default:
"The moral suasion has continued under President Obama, who has urged that homeowners follow the 'responsible' course. Indeed, HUD-approved housing counselors are supposed to counsel people against foreclosure."
None of this should surprise anyone. Lenders want to avoid defaults because they want to get paid back. And the government is desperate to stem the tide of financial losses and prop-up the housing sector. Further, defaults create a sort of externality: if I default, I can depress the value of the houses in my neighborhood, weakening the financial position of my neighbors.

However, in many cases default is the best financial option for individual homeowners. As Lowenstein points out, businesses use strategic default in the same sort of situations. Recently, Morgan Stanley walked away from buildings it owned in San Francisco, without incurring moral outrage. In their case, it was simply business.

While it's understandable that policymakers are unhappy with strategic default, it makes no sense to hold individuals to a higher moral standard than corporations. Any coercion from government to try and get people to keep paying their mortgage is essentially a transfer of wealth from homeowners to lenders. That is not, in and of itself, a worthy policy goal.

Rather, if the government is truly concerned with the strategic default, it could try a suggestion put forth by economist Dean Baker. Baker has advocated for "The Right to Rent Plan", which would grant homeowners facing foreclosure the right to rent their home for a period of 5-10 years from the lender at the fair market rental rate. Such a policy would give borrowers and lenders an extended period to work out mortgage modifications, which would prevent the externalities imposed on communities by foreclosures. It provides a better deal for the lender (who gets revenue from the rental fees) and the borrowers (who avoid the credit impact of foreclosure). Further, this would not require government revenue, nor would it unduly reward reckless borrowers or lenders.

We all have an interest in preventing future foreclosures, but guilt is probably not the most effective policy tool to achieve this goal.

Sunday, December 6, 2009

How I learned to stop worrying and love the deficit

Large deficits can elicit emotional reactions (see Tea Party Movement). But Robert Frank gives some good reasons not to be too worried about our current fiscal situation:
"...when total spending falls well below the level required for full employment, the economy won’t recover quickly on its own. Consumers won’t lead the way, because even those who still have jobs are fearful they might lose them. And most businesses won’t invest, since they already have more capacity than they need. Only government, Mr. Keynes concluded, has both the motive and opportunity to increase spending significantly during deep downturns.

Of course, if the government borrows to do so, the debt must eventually be repaid (or the interest on it must be paid forever). That fact has provoked strident protests about government “bankrupting our grandchildren.” It’s an absurd complaint. Failure to stimulate the economy would mean a longer downturn. That, in turn, would mean longer stretches of reduced tax receipts, increased unemployment insurance payouts, and depressed private investment. The net result? Higher total public borrowing and a permanent decline in productivity compared with what we would have had under effective economic stimulus. Once the economy is back on its feet, deficit logic changes. At full employment, extra borrowing often compromises future prosperity, just as critics say. On President George W. Bush’s watch, for example, the national debt rose from $5 trillion to $10 trillion. Some of that borrowing paid for an expansion of prescription coverage and a financial bailout a year ago, but most went for a war in Iraq and tax cuts that largely just allowed for additional consumption. Our grandchildren will be forever poorer as a result.

But the reverse would be true if government borrowing were used for productive investments. After decades of neglect of the nation’s infrastructure, attractive public investment opportunities abound. It’s been estimated, for example, that eliminating bottlenecks on the Northeast rail corridor would generate $12 billion in benefits at a cost of only $6 billion. These are present value estimates. When government undertakes such investments, our grandchildren become richer, not poorer...

In the meantime, however, such commentary continues to render intelligent political decisions about deficits less likely. For example, 58 percent of respondents in a recent NBC News-Wall Street Journal poll said the president and Congress should worry less about bolstering the economy than keeping the deficit down, while only 35 percent said economic recovery was a higher priority. If we really want to bankrupt our grandchildren, that poll charts a promising course."
Much of Frank's argument is basic Keyensian economics: in a recession, government spending is needed to offset the decline in private spending. But whatever your feelings about Keynes' theories, Frank's basic point is quite intuitive. The vast majority of the deficit has been caused by a collapse in tax receipts, which were caused by the recession. That means that anything that will cause output to grow faster will reduce the long-term deficit by increasing tax receipts. That means that spending today won't necessarily "bankrupt our grandchildren".

The politics of deficit reduction are all too predictable: when a party is out of power, they seem to find that old religion. But that doesn't mean we can't have a rational discussion about budgets.

Friday, October 2, 2009

Debating the Keynesian Multiplier

The old joke about economists is that if you laid them all together from head to toe they still wouldn't reach a conclusion. While there are many areas where economists broadly agree, the virtues of economic stimulus is not one.

The latest salvo in this rather un-gentlemanly (and gentlewomanly) debate comes via Harvard's Robert Barro, writing in the Wall Street Journal:
"The bottom line is this: The available empirical evidence does not support the idea that spending multipliers typically exceed one, and thus spending stimulus programs will likely raise GDP by less than the increase in government spending. Defense-spending multipliers exceeding one likely apply only at very high unemployment rates, and nondefense multipliers are probably smaller. However, there is empirical support for the proposition that tax rate reductions will increase real GDP."
Barro is summarizing his research into the size and impact of multipliers, in which he analyzed US GDP and changes in government spending data over time. Increases in government spending, according to Barro, haven't led to proportionally larger increases in GDP, as Keynesian analysis might suggest.

Mark Thoma chastens Barro for essentially re-cycling an op-ed (compare his new piece to this article from January) and, in response, re-posts some of the criticisms made at the time by people like Paul Krugman, Brad DeLong and Christina Romer.

For as important an issue as fiscal stimulus is, there is surprisingly scant research into its effectiveness. The best work is by David and Christina Romer, but they look at tax cuts as opposed to government spending.

Fortunately, Ethan Ilzetzki, Enrique G. Mendoza and Carlos A.Vegh have just published some new research, which looks at the impact government spending on GDP for a panel of 45 countries (20 developed, 25 developing). Their conclusions include:
  1. In developing countries, the response of output to increases in government spending is smaller on impact and considerably less persistent than in high income countries.
  2. The degree of exchange rate flexibility is a critical determinant of the size of fiscal multipliers. Economies operating under predetermined exchange rate regimes have long-run multipliers of around 1.5, but economies with flexible exchange rate regimes have essentially zero multipliers.
  3. The degree of openness to trade (measured as exports plus imports as a proportion of GDP) is another critical determinant. Relatively closed economies have long-run multipliers of around 1.6, but relatively open economies have very small or zero multipliers.
  4. In highly-indebted countries, the output response to increases in government spending is short-lived and much less persistent than in countries with a low debt to GDP ratio.
  5. The multipliers for the US in the post-1980 period are rather small (in the range 0.3-0.4) both in the short and long-run. On the other hand, multipliers for government investment are large (around 2).
While far from the last word on the issue, the Ilzetzki, Mendoza and Vegh (IMV) work provides us with a much more subtle analysis of the nature of the Keynesian multiplier. It suggests that developed countries can use fiscal stimulus to boost employment in recessions, particularly if the spending takes the form of government investment. Interestingly, IMV's conclusions support Keynes' original claims. I'm currently reading Keynes' "The General Theory" and stumbled upon these passages:
Fiscal stimulus in rich vs. poor countries:

"Thus whilst the multiplier is larger in a poor community, the effect on employment will be much greater in a wealthy community, assuming that in the latter current investment represents a larger proportion of current output." (p126)

Trade openess and fiscal stimulus:

"In an open system with foreign trade relations, some part of the multiplier of the increased investment will accrue to the benefit of employment in foreign countries... so that if we consider only the effect on domestic employment as distinct from world employment, we must diminish the full figure of the multiplier." (p120)
It seems that Keynes, writing in 1935, predicted findings (1) and (3) in IMV.

Finally, as one might expect, Paul Krugman weights in, yet again:

"On a happier note, this piece by Ilzetzki et al is interesting, and offers a wide range of multipliers depending on a country's situation. The question for the United States is which estimate is most relevant.

I'd say it's the fixed exchange rate estimate. Yes, I know, we have a floating rate. But they explain the relatively high fixed-rate number by pointing to Mundell-Fleming, which says that fiscal policy is effective under fixed rates because it doesn't drive up interest rates (capital flows in). We're in a similar position for a different reason: fiscal expansion doesn't drive up rates because we're at the zero bound.

Oh, we're also relatively closed.

The thing is that both the fixed rate and closed multipliers are around 1.5 — which so happens to be just about the number assumed by Christina Romer in her analysis for the Obama administration. Just saying."

Sunday, April 19, 2009

Double standards on taxes

Last post on Tea Parties, I promise.

Former Reagan official and economist Bruce Bartlett has some wise words on debt and deficits:
...many protesters implicitly assume that that the deficit has increased solely as a result of Barack Obama's policies. But in fact, the Congressional Budget Office was projecting a deficit of more than $1 trillion this year back in January, before any of Obama's policies had been enacted, and a cumulative deficit of $4.3 trillion through 2019. (CBO made no assumptions about what his policies might be in making its projection.)

It's true that projected deficits have gotten larger since January. But much of this resulted from deteriorating economic conditions that would have occurred even if John McCain were president. Moreover, it is absurd to assume that McCain would not have enacted any stimulus programs had he been elected.

More than likely, McCain would have proposed a stimulus plan of roughly the same size as that proposed by Obama. No doubt, it would have had a different composition--heavier on tax cuts, different kinds of tax cuts, less spending, different spending--but it wouldn't have been all that different from Obama's package given large Democratic majorities in the House and Senate and the pressure to act quickly.

I strongly suspect that many of those that loudly denounced the Obama stimulus package for its impact on the deficit would have cheered the McCain stimulus package even though it would have increased the deficit by about the same amount.

Proof of this proposition is that there were no tea parties during the years when George W. Bush was turning the surpluses of the Clinton years into massive deficits. Indeed, if concerns about deficits are the primary motivation for this week's tax protests, then these same people should have been holding demonstrations of support for Bill Clinton in 2000 when the federal government ran a budget surplus of 2.4% of the gross domestic product--equivalent to a surplus of $336 billion this year.

The truth is that the greatest addition to national indebtedness occurred in 2003 when Bush rammed through the Republican Congress a massive expansion of Medicare to provide drug benefits even though the system was already broke. According to the latest report from Medicare's trustees, the drug benefit added $7.9 trillion to the nation's indebtedness. This should have led to massive tax protests on April 15, 2004. But, of course, there weren't any. Those protesting this week were only protesting because it is a Democrat who has increased the deficit. When a Republican did worse, it's like Emily Litella used to say, "Never mind."
I'm not saying that because a Republican ran up debt, it's OK for Democrats to do it as well. But I think there are some serious misconceptions about how much the Obama administration's policies change the debt situation. First, much of the current increase in the deficit is the result of decreased tax revenues, which are the result of a bad economy. Second, the Bush administration bequeathed a number of policies that would increase the debt far enough after he left office.

We do need to get serious about government debt. But that means getting serious about health care reform, since Medicare will be the biggest cause of rising debt in the future. The current conversations are largely a diversion.

Read the whole Bartlett piece, especially his conclusion:
People should remember that while they have the right to their opinion, they are not entitled to be taken seriously. That only comes from having credibility gained by the correct presentation of facts and analysis and a willingness to be even-handed--criticizing one's own side when it is wrong and not only speaking up when the other party does the same thing.

Friday, February 6, 2009

The long road down

The January jobs report was released this week. As David Leonhardt explains, it's not filled with good news:

The government said that 385,000 more jobs were lost last year than it had initially estimated. That brings the total loss since December 2007 to 3.6 million jobs. To put that in some perspective, here are the worst employment losses, as a share of the work force, over the last 40 years:

1981-82: 3.1 percent
1974-75: 2.8 percent
Current (2007-09): 2.6 percent

Keep in mind that the numbers for those earlier recessions describe the absolute low point of the job market. The losses in this recession aren’t yet over — and may, in fact, be a long way from over.
That last part is important. Right now, we're still doing better than in the early 1980s (and much better than the 1930s), but the real question is: where are we going? Many economists think we've got a long way to go.

Things certainly have changed over the past 16 years:

(HT: Paul Krugman)