Lies, damn lies, refuted by statistics

According to the early reviews, Selena Robert's new book paints a rather unflattering picture of Yankees' third-baseman Alex Rodriguez. Aside from accusing A-Rod of having taken steroids since high school, Roberts alleges that Rodriguez and other opposing players tipped pitches during blow-outs; knowing what pitches were coming, they could improve their statistics.

Unfortunately, Roberts has little more than anonymous sources to support her story. So baseball statisticians had to delve into past seasons in order to find evidence of A-Rod's malfeasance. The stats cast doubt on Robert's allegations:

"If a tipping conspiracy were in place, one would expect that Rodriguez and rival middle infielders in games he played to have hit better in low-leverage situations than in high-leverage ones. Using a fairly loose definition of high leverage as a L.I. above 1.5 and low leverage as below 0.7, the data provide a resounding answer: either no tipping was going on or it was pathetically ineffective.

Contrary to his reputation as a choker, Rodriguez was actually at his best when the game was on the line as a Ranger. According to data compiled by Sean Forman of Baseball-Reference.com, his combined on-base and slugging percentages (O.P.S.) from 2001 to 2003 was 1.076 in high-leverage situations, compared with 1.017 for medium leverage and .982 in low leverage. Opposing second basemen and shortstops showed the same pattern. They registered an .899 O.P.S. when leverage was high, .825 when it was middling, and .817 when it was low. Unless Rodriguez’s behavior was even more nefarious — tipping only when it mattered most — the numbers give no reason to believe he was involved.

Using a more stringent definition of blowouts yields the same result. In plate appearances in which the teams were separated by seven runs or more, Rodriguez mustered just a .851 O.P.S., compared with 1.021 when the margin was six or fewer runs. His middle infield counterparts compiled a .744 mark in the laughers and .840 the rest of the time."

Of course, we should not mistake absence of evidence for evidence of absence. It is possible that A-Rod tipped pitches on rare occasions; rare enough that one or two extra home-runs wouldn't show up in this kind of analysis. But this does provide strong evidence against the possibility that this kind of behavior was widespread. That conclusion may not restore our collective innocence, but it's nice to know.

Should New Yorkers pay for new stadiums?

I'm a big Yankees fan. But as an adult, I realize that not everyone shares my interests. Certainly, I would never ask anyone else to pay for my tickets to a game. And yet, this is exactly what is happening with public financing for new stadiums for both the Mets and Yankees. According to the New York Times:

"Days after taking office in 2002, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg killed Rudolph W. Giuliani’s plan to spend $800 million in city funds to build baseball stadiums for the Yankees and the Mets, saying they were too expensive during a recession.

Three years later, Mr. Bloomberg unveiled his own plan calling for the two teams to pay the construction costs of their new stadiums, while the city would build public parks, parking garages and transit stations nearby. The cost to taxpayers, the mayor suggested, would be relatively small and the benefits to the city would be great...

But as the two stadiums near completion, the cost to taxpayers is anything but small, a review of the projects shows. Though the teams are indeed paying approximately $2 billion to erect the two stadiums, the cost to the city for infrastructure — parks, garages and transportation improvements — have jumped to about $458 million, from $281 million in 2005. The state is contributing an additional $201 million."

This doesn't include tax-breaks and other indirect subsidies, which have totaled roughly $480 million.

This type of public financing is not uncommon in cities throughout the country. City governments and residents are wooed by "Impact Reports" purporting to show that these new stadiums will revitalize abandon down-town areas, create jobs and spur economic growth. The only problem is, this isn't really true.

Some of the most interesting research in this area has been done by Brad Humphreys and Dennis Coates, two economists at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Humphreys and Coates have done numerous studies assessing the impact of new stadiums on cities, generally finding no significant economic benefit to residents.

There are several reasons for this, but one of the most important is that people only have a certain amount of disposable income to spend on entertainment. They might spend it at a baseball game or at a concert or at the movies. But people wont spend more just because there are more entertainment options.

Humphreys and Coates looked at a series of Players' strikes and lockouts, which are perfect natural experiments to test the economic impact of sports franchises. What they found was that strikes and lockouts didn't cause the local economies to suffer; rather, people went to more concerts, movies and restaurants.

The case for public stadium financing is based on it's supposed benefit to the local economy. In reality, public financing is a tax-payer giveaway to developers and teams--exactly the people who don't need government help.