The buck stops somewhere else (try Treasury... or the Fed)

Tyler Cowen says that Congress has opted out of much of the economic crisis. That might not be a bad move on their part:

While Congressional leaders are consulted on the major policies, Congress is keeping its distance, perhaps to minimize voter outrage. This way, Congress can claim credit if a recovery comes, but deny responsibility if the price tag ends up higher than advertised or if banks seem to be receiving unfair benefits from the government.

Of course, while this may be a smart decision for Congress, it might have serious consequences for economic policy in the future:

A Congress that won’t accept much responsibility for the financial bailouts, for example, is unlikely to rise to the occasion when the time comes to make tough decisions on the budget...

On any single policy, the abdication of Congressional responsibility may not be a problem. Sometimes it is good to let the technocrats have their way. In the longer run, though, the United States requires a Congress courageous enough to accept responsibility for potentially unpopular policies. We are moving further away from that every day.

Most economic models typically assume that government will follow some optimal policy. But in reality government is subject to incentives, and in this case Congress doesn't have much reason to get too involved in this crisis. This is why the Federal Reserve (and much of the bureaucracy) is insulated from political pressure: there are tough decisions to be made and no one up for re-election wants to make them.

As Cowen points out, the danger comes about when the elected body doesn't have to make the tough decisions. When the time comes and they have to address the budget deficit--or whether to nationalize part of the banking sector--they won't have built up political capital by leveling with the public about what needs to be done and what can be done.

It may be time for Congress to bite the bullet and, well, actually do something.